2024
Bosch
Year
Sector
Industrie légère
ACT assessment methodology
Generic
Performance Score
Bosch has set itself climate goals only for 2030, with no long-term ambitions or milestones in between. The company is targeting an 85% reduction in its scope 1 and 2 emissions compared to 2018 (market-based), as well as a 30% reduction in its scope 3 emissions (purchases of goods, transport, use of products). Both targets are validated by SBTi and aligned with a 1.5°C trajectory. Bosch shows a 97% reduction in its market-based scope 2 in 2023, exclusively thanks to the purchase of renewable electricity. However, its scope 1 emissions increased by 8% over the same period, illustrating an opportunistic approach, focused on the simplest levers.
The strategy to reduce indirect emissions is marked by many actions, but the lack of transparency and consolidated indicators limits their credibility. Bosch does not publish a breakdown of emissions by division or activity, nor does it publish overall targets by product type. The levers identified concern increasing the share of recycled materials (steel, aluminium, plastics), improving the energy efficiency of products (particularly in household appliances and automobiles), and optimising logistics. While the efforts of some divisions seem real, they are not part of a structured approach at the group level. Between 2018 and 2023, Bosch reduced its scope 3 emissions by 27%, largely due to the transformation of its portfolio towards more energy-intensive products and the transition of the automotive market to electric.
The transition plan remains poorly detailed, without clear strategic management at the group level. Climate governance is carried out by the CEO and a member of the board, without any specific expertise on climate, and without an explicit link between climate objectives and variable compensation. Climate risk analysis exists but remains vague, without methodology or detailed results.
Bosch's supplier policy is robust: collection of emissions data, target contracts with suppliers, and deployment of a demanding code of conduct. Targets exist for the adoption of SBTi commitments by suppliers (target of 50% in 2030, 38% in 2024). On the customer side, on the other hand, Bosch does not present a structured strategy for committing targets on the emissions avoided by its decarbonization solutions. However, the group is capitalising on the growth of electromobility, with an ambition of €6 billion in sales in 2026 in this sector.
Bosch's lobbying policies raise questions. The company does not publish an audit of its affiliations or an action plan in the event of misalignment with its climate values. It remains a member of several associations with ambivalent positions on the climate (VDA, CLEPA, SMMT) and publicly opposes certain European energy transition policies, in particular the phase-out of the combustion engine in 2035.
Finally, although Bosch already has active business models in climate services and renewable energies, no clear strategy is published for their development. Efforts are mentioned on the circular economy and the elimination of inefficient products, but without objectives or timetable. Bosch has also not made a commitment to exit business models that are incompatible with a low-carbon economy, particularly in the combustion engine car or aviation industries. Finally, Bosch does not disclose the share of sales linked to low-carbon products or the exit plan for its most emissive activities.
The strategy to reduce indirect emissions is marked by many actions, but the lack of transparency and consolidated indicators limits their credibility. Bosch does not publish a breakdown of emissions by division or activity, nor does it publish overall targets by product type. The levers identified concern increasing the share of recycled materials (steel, aluminium, plastics), improving the energy efficiency of products (particularly in household appliances and automobiles), and optimising logistics. While the efforts of some divisions seem real, they are not part of a structured approach at the group level. Between 2018 and 2023, Bosch reduced its scope 3 emissions by 27%, largely due to the transformation of its portfolio towards more energy-intensive products and the transition of the automotive market to electric.
The transition plan remains poorly detailed, without clear strategic management at the group level. Climate governance is carried out by the CEO and a member of the board, without any specific expertise on climate, and without an explicit link between climate objectives and variable compensation. Climate risk analysis exists but remains vague, without methodology or detailed results.
Bosch's supplier policy is robust: collection of emissions data, target contracts with suppliers, and deployment of a demanding code of conduct. Targets exist for the adoption of SBTi commitments by suppliers (target of 50% in 2030, 38% in 2024). On the customer side, on the other hand, Bosch does not present a structured strategy for committing targets on the emissions avoided by its decarbonization solutions. However, the group is capitalising on the growth of electromobility, with an ambition of €6 billion in sales in 2026 in this sector.
Bosch's lobbying policies raise questions. The company does not publish an audit of its affiliations or an action plan in the event of misalignment with its climate values. It remains a member of several associations with ambivalent positions on the climate (VDA, CLEPA, SMMT) and publicly opposes certain European energy transition policies, in particular the phase-out of the combustion engine in 2035.
Finally, although Bosch already has active business models in climate services and renewable energies, no clear strategy is published for their development. Efforts are mentioned on the circular economy and the elimination of inefficient products, but without objectives or timetable. Bosch has also not made a commitment to exit business models that are incompatible with a low-carbon economy, particularly in the combustion engine car or aviation industries. Finally, Bosch does not disclose the share of sales linked to low-carbon products or the exit plan for its most emissive activities.
Narrative Score
Business model and strategy: Bosch's profits are largely based on thermal mobility. Bosch seems to be proactive in the development of electromobility, but above all benefits from the market's transformative effects. Other branches of the company are showing an appetite for the low-carbon transition.
Consistency and credibility: About 60% of Bosch's turnover is generated in mobility. Although Bosch is proactive on electromobility, the company has not defined a plan to phase out thermal mobility and seems to be adapting mainly to the market, while lobbying to ease regulations on the exit from combustion in Europe. The transformation of business models is not clearly planned and these new BMs are not really integrated into a long-term transformation vision. The transition is therefore not very credible.
Data quality: No published data on all scope 3 items. For advertised positions: approach to collecting data from suppliers to improve data quality; but no information on the methodologies used to calculate emissions from the use of products, which are often very sensitive to assumptions. Bosch appears to manufacture semiconductors but does not mention direct emissions, including fluorinated gases. Clear emissions reporting format, including the "sustainability figures" website that allows environmental data to be selected in an interactive way.
Reputation: Bosch has been involved in a notable environmental scandal related to the automotive industry. The company has been accused of complicity in the diesel engine emissions scandal called "Dieselgate". This scandal concerned the manipulation of pollutant emissions tests by certain car manufacturers. Bosch, as a supplier of automotive components, has been accused of providing software used to circumvent emissions tests in the United States. The company has launched an internal investigation to determine the possible involvement of its employees in this scandal and has cooperated with the authorities in the investigations.
Risks: Bosch is highly dependent on thermal mobility: around 60% of profits are linked to mobility and only 10% of this activity is linked to electromobility. The low-carbon transition of the mobility business is strongly linked to the EU's climate policy on the phase-out of combustion engines by 2035. However, this policy is threatened by new political discussions. Paradoxically, Bosch's lobbying activities are pushing for a review of the phase-out of combustion engines.
Consistency and credibility: About 60% of Bosch's turnover is generated in mobility. Although Bosch is proactive on electromobility, the company has not defined a plan to phase out thermal mobility and seems to be adapting mainly to the market, while lobbying to ease regulations on the exit from combustion in Europe. The transformation of business models is not clearly planned and these new BMs are not really integrated into a long-term transformation vision. The transition is therefore not very credible.
Data quality: No published data on all scope 3 items. For advertised positions: approach to collecting data from suppliers to improve data quality; but no information on the methodologies used to calculate emissions from the use of products, which are often very sensitive to assumptions. Bosch appears to manufacture semiconductors but does not mention direct emissions, including fluorinated gases. Clear emissions reporting format, including the "sustainability figures" website that allows environmental data to be selected in an interactive way.
Reputation: Bosch has been involved in a notable environmental scandal related to the automotive industry. The company has been accused of complicity in the diesel engine emissions scandal called "Dieselgate". This scandal concerned the manipulation of pollutant emissions tests by certain car manufacturers. Bosch, as a supplier of automotive components, has been accused of providing software used to circumvent emissions tests in the United States. The company has launched an internal investigation to determine the possible involvement of its employees in this scandal and has cooperated with the authorities in the investigations.
Risks: Bosch is highly dependent on thermal mobility: around 60% of profits are linked to mobility and only 10% of this activity is linked to electromobility. The low-carbon transition of the mobility business is strongly linked to the EU's climate policy on the phase-out of combustion engines by 2035. However, this policy is threatened by new political discussions. Paradoxically, Bosch's lobbying activities are pushing for a review of the phase-out of combustion engines.
Trend score
Bosch does not have a long-term climate target or a structured group-wide transition plan. Although some divisions implement eco-design actions and follow internal roadmaps, the lack of overall management and a consolidated vision limits the readability and credibility of the company's climate strategy. This fragmented approach is not encouraging in terms of transition.
In addition, while Bosch has so far benefited greatly from the market dynamics linked to the transition of the automotive sector to electric, this development could be called into question by the European Union in the years to come. A possible slowdown in the electrification of the sector would then pose a significant risk to the group's continued decline in emissions.
In addition, while Bosch has so far benefited greatly from the market dynamics linked to the transition of the automotive sector to electric, this development could be called into question by the European Union in the years to come. A possible slowdown in the electrification of the sector would then pose a significant risk to the group's continued decline in emissions.
Source
ACT Eval 2
Evaluator
CITEPA
GLOBAL SCORE
Performance score (/100)
38
Disclosure score (/100)
86
ℹ️
Narrative Score (A > E)
C
Trend Score (- = +)
=
Scores by module
#1 : best score in the sample
N/A% = module not applicable to the sectoral methodology
Target Score : 31%
Material Investment Score : 13%
Intangible Investment Score : 0%
Sold Product Performance Score : 70%
Management Score : 46%
Supplier Engagement Score : 74%
Client Engagement Score : 44%
Policy Engagement Score : 8%
Business Model Score : 7%
Indicator weight by module